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RES NOVA IN ILLINOIS LAND USE PLANNING
JAMES E. STARRS
I T "HE war against urban blight can never assume the stature of a
.1 sweeping offensive until the stockpiling of legal weapons
L quickens its pace. This work is but one attempt to equalize the
disproportion between the development of urban blight and the evolu-
tion of new legal controls to meet it.
The power to tax, Chief Justice John Marshall once said,' is the
power to destroy. Indisputably, then, the power to tax is also the power
to control and to direct. In recognition of this truism, some city plan-
ners and others2 have advised that the authority of a municipal corpo-
ration to tax property should be used as one feature in the total com-
plex, and sometimes occult, network of land use planning. However, no
data has yet been disclosed to indicate that a program of property tax
relief for individual homeowners has been initiated in any area in the
nation which is undergoing urban renewal activities. Consequently,
our elucidation of this matter will be without precedent in or analogy
to any other jurisdiction, including other locations in this state.
The fundamental purpose in employing the taxation power in land
use planning is twofold. Principally, it is directed to encouraging and
stimulating landowners to improve and maintain their property in the
hope of receiving a tax concession in return for their diligent efforts.
But at the same time, however, a certain measure of control may be
expected to accrue to the local taxing authority with respect not only
to the fact of property rehabilitation but also to the manner in which
it is to be achieved. It is in this latter connection that this technique be-
comes significant in a system of controls over land use.
1 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819).
2 REHABILITATION AND CONSERVATION ASPECTS OF URBAN RENEWAL 3 1, (Proceedings of
the 4th Working Conference on Problems in Urban Renewal, April 5-8, 1959) (edited
by Brussat).
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But it remains to be seen, in the ensuing sections, what technique
can, in conformity with the legal principles governing and restrictions
upon the power of taxation, best act as an incentive to spur landowners
to renovate their property.
A. GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF TAXATION
Taxation may be defined as the power by which the sovereign raises
revenue to defray the necessary costs of government. By taxation the
expenses of operating the machinery of government are apportioned
among those who in some measure are privileged to enjoy its benefits
and, in return, must bear its burdens. In the last analysis, the power of
taxation is a method of providing sufficient funds with which to pro-
mote the general welfare of the citizens.
Taxation may be distinguished from the police power and the
power of eminent domain, which are co-existent but distinct powers
of government. The exercise of the police power is limited by its rela-
tion to the public health, welfare and safety, which it seeks to regulate,
but the power of taxation depends, in large but not exclusive measure,
for its justification upon the public purpose it subserves. However, the
power of eminent domain, like the power to tax, may be asserted only
when in the public interest and, then, only after the payment of just
compensation. The analogy between the powers of eminent domain
and taxation is yet more exact since "what is a public purpose, for
which property may be taken by a municipality under the power of
eminent domain, as well as what is a public purpose for which a
municipality may spend its money or incur indebtedness. ... 3 are
identical.
Although there are various classes of taxes, i.e., capitation, excise
and property taxes, only the property tax is relevant to our present
inquiry for it is by the manipulation of this tax that government can,
in a limited way, control the use of land by its citizens. Pursuant to the
dictate of the Illinois Constitution,4 property taxes are computed on
an ad valorem basis. Moreover, property taxes may be further charac-
terized by the means used to raise them. Thus, government may tax
property by general taxation, special taxation or special assessment.
General taxation is the customary annual tax imposed upon all proper-
ty within a taxing district to provide revenue for the usual and ordi-
3 16 McQuILLIN, MUNICPAL CORPORATIONS 104 (3d. ed. 1950).
4 ILL. CONST. art. IX, S 1.
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nary day-to-day expenses of the government. By it the government
secures the general welfare of all its citizens without conferring a
special benefit on any select group of them. But a special tax or special
assessment, the terms are roughly equivalent,5 is levied upon a particu-
lar portion of the community whose property has been enhanced by a
local improvement. Unlike the general tax, a special tax or assessment
is intended for the direct benefit of those who contribute to it. In Illi-
nois, furthermore, a special tax or assessment need not meet the consti-
tutional requirement of uniformity and equality which controls the
imposition of a general tax. 6
The power to tax may be further delimited by the governmental
unit which levies it. Only the state itself has an inherent power to tax,
limited only by express constitutional restrictions. Subdivisions of the
state, i.e., municipal and quasi-municipal corporations, are creatures of
delegated authority only, which are controlled not only by the Illinois
and Federal Constitutions but also by the terms of the grant from the
state. In general, absent constitutional restrictions, a state's "power of
taxation is regarded as unlimited, plenary, comprehensive and supreme;
the principal check upon its abuse resting in the responsibility of the
members of the legislature to their constituents. ' 7 But subordinate gov-
ernmental instrumentalities take their powers to tax from the revenue
article of the Illinois Constitution" and the legislation enacted by the
General Assembly 9 in implementing these non-self-executing provi-
sions.
The practical administration of taxation involves a variety of pro-
cedures which can be conveniently subsumed under two phases, i.e.,
the levy and the collection of taxes. In more detail, the stages prelimi-
nary to the collection of a tax are the budget which indicates the fiscal
needs; the appropriation which stipulates the purpose of the expendi-
tures; the assessment which adjusts the share to be contributed by the
property involved; and the levy which declares the rate and amount of
the tax. Although each of these stages has its own distinct characteris-
tics, all have one feature in common, i.e., the requirement of itemiza-
tion. By itemization is meant the delineation, in separate categories, of
the varied purposes for which expenditures are necessary. Thus, for
5 Illinois Cent. R.R. v. City of Decatur, 126 I1. 92, 18 N.E. 315 (1888).
6 ILL. CONSnTION Article IX, section 9.
7 51 Am. Jur. 67-68. 8 Article IX.
9 Mainly in the Municipal Code, ILL. REv. STAT., ch. 24 (1961).
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example, to say that a certain sum is required for the "alteration and
rehabilitation of the old Criminal Courts building, including equip-
ment and furnishings"'10 is improper since it is impossible to determine
whether this contemplates the renovation of old equipment or the pur-
chase of new equipment. However, itemization does not require the
specification of every item which a municipality intends to pay out,
but a single general purpose may suffice "to include every expenditure
required for that purpose, although there may be many items."" The
cardinal principle is that the taxpayer has a right to be informed of the
exact purpose to which his money is to be devoted so that he may
elect, if he wishes, to challenge any item of the appropriation.
B. EXAMINATION OF ALTERNATIVES
In the main, the suggested alternatives for acquiring land use con-
trol through the power of property taxation have centered about those
phases of the taxation process preceding collection. Thus, the gamut
of recommendations runs from reducing the assessed value of real
estate, or altering the rate of taxation, or abating the tax amount
actually levied to imposing a freeze or temporary exemption from
taxation on certain property. All of these tax concessions would be
contingent upon the landowner's agreement to improve his property
or his actually having done so.
In evaluating the constitutional validity of these methods of tax
abatement it is essential, at the outset, to recognize that the central con-
stitutional provision in Illinois regulating the adoption and operation
of any tax is that it must be uniform and equal. In the words of the
Illinois Constitution, "the General Assembly shall provide such revenue
as may be needful.., by levying a tax, by valuation, so that every
person and corporation shall pay a tax in proportion to the value of his,
her or its property .... -12 This limitation is also enforced by the equal
protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Consti-
tution.' 3 Basically, the principle of uniformity strives to effect a just
distribution of the tax burdens among the persons who stand to benefit
from the operations of the government imposing the tax.
10People v. Advance Heating Co., 376 I1. 158, 166, 33 N.E. 2d 206, 211 (1941).
11 People v. Sage, 375 Ill. 411, 419, 31 N.E. 2d 791, 795 (1941).
12 Article IX, S 1. See also Article IX, S S 9 and 10; Article IV, S 34 and ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 24, § 8-3-5 (1961).
13 Hanover Fire Ins. Co. v. Carr, 72 U.S. 494 (1926).
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The Illinois courts, in interpreting the concept of uniformity, have
consistently adhered to the important qualification that uniformity or
equality is to be determined by the impact of the tax throughout the
political unit by or with respect to which the tax is levied. 4 This
means, for example, that a tax for state purposes must be uniform
throughout the state and that a tax for a county purpose must be equal
in the county. Thus, taxes imposed by local subdivisions need not be
on a parity with taxes imposed by other similar subdivisions in the state
as long as there is uniformity and equality within each individual tax-
ing district, i.e., city, county, town, etc.
Therefore, if an act levying a school fund tax throughout the state
exempts districts where there is no high school, even though the resi-
dents of that district use the high schools of adjoining districts, not
only is the uniformity principle of Article IX, section 1, of the Illinois
Constitution violated but so too is Article IX, section 6,1" of that con-
stitution. Moreover, uniformity is also offended when a tax reduction
or other concession less than complete remission is involved. For that
reason, a statute providing for the installment payment of delinquent
taxes on realty in counties containing 500,000 or more inhabitants and
for waiver of interest, forfeitures, delinquencies, and penalties is un-
constitutional as providing for non-uniform taxation."
Uniformity is so much the dominating factor in any tax revenue
system in Illinois that it will even control in a situation infected by an
unlawful assessment of property. Therefore, if property throughout
the state is uniformly assessed at 37% of its fair market value, then,
notwithstanding that all property should be assessed at its full fair cash
value, and in failing to do so the assessors are violating their official
duties, the Illinois courts will invalidate for inequality a tax on one
individual at 60% of the fair market value of his property.' 7 Other
decisions have held to the same effect.' However, even though in sub-
stance an overvaluation may result in a lack of uniformity, still, relief
may be denied for, procedurally, the Illinois courts require evidence
that "the valuation has been made fraudulently ... or overvalued so
14The Hub v. Hanberg, 211 111. 43, 71 N.E. 826 (1904).
1 Board of Education v. Haworth, 274 Ill. 538, 113 N.E. 939 (1916).
1 People v. Jarecki, 363 Il. 180, 1 N.E. 2d 855 (1936).
17People v. Illinois Central R.R., 355 111. 605, 190 N.E. 82 (1934).
18 People v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co., 300 Ill. 399, 133 N.E. 325 (1921); In Re Chicago
Rys. Co., 175 F. 2d 282 (7th Cir. 1949).
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excessively that under the circumstances it amounts to constructive
fraud ... "19 Moreover, uniformity is as equally applicable to the rate
of taxation as to the mode of assessment.20
However, on a number of occasions, the Illinois Supreme Court has
upheld statutes which, on their face, did not conform to the constitu-
tional requirement of uniformity and equality. In Scbreiber v. Cook
County,21 for instance, a statute (popularly known as the Scavenger
Act) extinguishing the tax lien on delinquent property following a tax
sale was challenged as involving inequality and, in fact, unjust dis-
crimination to the advantage of those who neglected to pay their taxes.
After remarking that there is a substantial legal distinction between an
extinguishment of a tax lien on a judicial sale and the remission or dis-
charge by direct legislation, the court declared that perfect equality of
taxation is an impossible and impractical goal. Indeed, the court
reasoned, "inequalities that result occasionally and incidentally in the
application of a system that is not arbitrary in its classification, and not
applied in a hostile or discriminatory manner, are not sufficient to de-
feat the tax.' 22
Other cases 23 have also revealed a patent, but valid, lack of uniform-
ity in taxation. Thus, where a budget or appropriation ordinance in-
cludes as debits abatements for uncollectible taxes and the taxes on
property to be forfeited for tax delinquencies and, as a consequence,
requires an increase in the tax levy to compensate for these items, the
courts have refused to vitiate this procedure for three reasons. First,
the items are merely for the purpose of balancing the budget. Second,
the only taxes to be abated are those which are uncollectible after
genuine efforts have been made to obtain their payment. Third, these
loss and cost allowances are not for monies to be expended but are
merely estimates of taxes that will not be received. If, however, no
bona fide attempt to collect the taxes had preceded their inclusion
among other items of loss and cost in the budget or appropriation
ordinance, then, to permit such a practice would be to approve the
19 People v. Hendrickson Pontiac, 12 Ill. 2d 477, 479-80, 147 N.E. 2d 29, 30 (1957).
20 Giebelhausen v. Daley, 407 Ill. 25, 95 N.E. 2d 84 (1950).
21388 11. 297, 58 N.E. 2d 40 (1944).
22 Id. at 303, 58 N.E. 2d at 43 (Emphasis added).
2
sPeople v. 1500 Lake Shore Drive Bldg. Corp., 376 Ill. 301, 33 N.E. 2d 455 (1941);
People v. Sage, 375 111. 411, 31 N.E. 2d 791 (1941); People v. Advance Heating Co., 376
Il. 158, 33 N.E. 2d 206 (1941).
DE PAUL LAW REVIEW
absolute abnegation of the constitutional requirement of uniformity, a
result not to be condoned.24
The power of a municipality to tax does not, by necessary implica-
tion, include the power to remit or compromise taxes since such local
governmental units are creatures of delegated authority only 25 and be-
cause a tax, not being predicated upon a contract, cannot be discharged
by reason of cootractual considerations. Furthermore, by dint of the
terms of the Illinois Constitution itself,26 a state may not commute or
release a local tax since the state must "require that all the taxable
property within the limits of municipal corporations shall be taxed for
the payment of debts contracted under authority of law, such taxes to
be uniform ....." Thus, an act of the General Assembly purporting to
exempt foreign insurance companies from liability to personal proper-
ty taxes is in direct opposition to this Illinois constitutional provision. 27
In addition, another provision of the Illinois Constitution removes
from the General Assembly the "power to release or extinguish, in
whole or in part, the indebtedness, liability, or obligation of any corpo-
ration or individual ... to any municipal corporation therein."2" As a
natural concomitant to this prohibition, it would seem reasonable that
what the General Assembly cannot do, it cannot authorize a munici-
pality to do; but, in one of the few decisions29 construing this section of
the Illinois Constitution, the court permitted the City of Chicago to
release the indebtedness of a railroad corporation in return for its
voluntary undertaking to elevate its tracks. In answering the assertion
that such conduct plainly offended Article IV, section 23, of the Illi-
nois Constitution, the court said that the limitation of that provision
"would not prohibit a city council from giving up a liability in con-
sideration for something which was deemed of equal or greater
value. 30 However, the dearth of other authority relating to a munici-
pality's power to release a tax obligation in view of Article IV, section
2 3, seems to mitigate the controlling effect of the broad statement in
24 People v. Chicago, M., St. P. & P, R.R., 354 111. 438, 188 N.E. 404 (1933).
25 38 Am. Jur. 77, 5 388; 16 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations 343 (3d ed. 1950);
People v. Kimmel, 323 Ill. 261, 154 N.E. 97 (1926); see annotations in 99 A.L.R. 1062
(1935) and 28 A.L.R. 2d 1425 (1953).
26 Article IX, s 10.
27 Raymond v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 196 Ill. 329, 63 N.E. 745 (1902).
28 Article IV, S 23.
29 City of Chicago v. Pittsburgh, C. C. & St. L. Ry., 244 Ill. 220, 91 N.E. 422 (1910).
Old. at 231,91 NE. at 422.
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that decision. Moreover, any endeavor by a municipality to release or
remit taxes must meet the challenge of the constitutional concept of
uniformity.
In sum, the foregoing elucidation of the relevant constitutional pro-
visions controlling taxation on the local level and the decisions inter-
preting these requirements would militate strongly against the imple-
mentation of a tax abatement mechanism to induce landowners to
renovate their property. A device of such a nature would be in serious
jeopardy immediately upon its inception for, if the concept of uni-
formity alone would not place an impenetrable barrier in the way of
its effectuation, then other constitutional and statutory provisions, 3'
the scope of which has not yet been fully delineated, which preclude
the remission or discharge of debts due to a municipality and exemp-
tion from taxation, as well as the very nature of a municipality as an
instrument of delegated authority only, would, in combination, go far
to make the success of such a scheme highly dubious.
Although it may be conceded that tax abatement procedures are
not the most appropriate device for land use control, that is not to say
that no other suitable alternative is available. In fact, the very recent
decision of the Illinois Supreme Court in Board of Library Directors v.
City of Lake Forest 2 has opened the way to a solution of this dilemma.
In that case, the General Assembly had passed legislation to ameliorate
the excessive tax burdens on the citizens of a township. Prior to this
enactment, the inhabitants of a city, which was partially within and
partially outside a township, who were citizens of the township were
being assessed by the township for a township library and by the city
for a city library, located outside the limits of the township. Under this
legislation, the proceeds of the township library tax derived from this
city were distributed to the city, which thereafter abated its library
tax on its citizens to that extent. The ultimate result was that the
inhabitants of the city who were also citizens of the township were
taxed to support one library only.
However, the directors of the township library objected that this
was a violation of the uniformity required by the Illinois Constitution.
The court agreed but added that "while the uniformity of levy and
assessment is the inexorable command of the Illinois Constitution, this
same standard of uniformity is not generally held to be applicable to
31 ILL. CONST. art. IV, S 23; ILL. REV. STAT., ch. 24, S 8-3-5 (1961).
82 17 IM. 2d 277, 161 N.E. 2d 272 (1959).
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the disposition of the tax after collection. '"" The disbursement of tax
proceeds, the court continued, "is limited by the admonition that the
proceeds of the tax must be used for the 'corporate purposes' of the
municipality levying the tax." 4 On this rationale, the court sustained
the challenged distribution of the tax.
With this decision in mind, it becomes possible to formulate a plan
of action and to test its legality against the pertinent statutes and deci-
sions. Instead, therefore, of reducing a tax before it is collected, why
will not a rebate or refund achieve the same purpose but without run-
ning afoul of the constitutional limitation of uniformity. Concededly,
a system of rebates, on the authority of the Board of Library Directors
decision, would be an acceptable method of avoiding the impact of the
uniformity rule, but it remains to be seen whether such a disposition of
tax funds is within the legitimate scope of a corporate purpose.
The power of taxation cannot be exercised for other than corporate
purposes. This is the inflexible command of the Illinois Constitution 31
and the statutes36 in execution of the authority granted by it. As de-
fined by an early Illinois decision,3 7 a corporate purpose embraces any
expenditure of tax revenue "in a manner which will promote the gen-
eral prosperity and welfare of the municipality that levies it." Later
decisions have not substantially modified the tenor of this definition
but have attempted to give it greater specificity. Thus, in Board of
Supervisors of Livingston County v. Wieder,8 the true doctrine of
what is a corporate purpose was said to be "such only, as are germane
to the objects of the creation of the municipality, at least such as have
a legitimate connection with these objects, and a manifest relation
thereto." Other decisions 9 of the Illinois Supreme Court have con-
sistently adhered to this interpretation of corporate purposes. How-
ever, in Board of Library Directors v. City of Lake Forest,4" the court
refused to limit the term to a narrow or rigid construction and, in fact,
33 Id. at 282, 161 N.E. 2d at 276.
84 Id. at 283, 161 N.E. 2d at 276.
35 ILL. CONST. art. IX, § 9; art. IV, S 34.
86 ILL. REV. STAT., ch. 24, § 8-3-1 (1961).
37 Taylor v. Thompson, 42 111. 8 (1866).
38 64 IMI. 427 (1872).
39 People v. Fleetwood, 413 Ill. 530, 109 N.E. 2d 741 (1952); Wetherell v. Devine, 116
Ill. 631, 6 N.E. 24 (1886).
40 17 Ill. 2d 276, 161 N.E. 2d 272, 276 (1959).
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reinstated and approved the general language of Taylor v. Thomp-
son41 to justify the disposition of tax funds by a township in support of
a city library outside the confines of the township. This decision indi-
cates, most conclusively, that a direct benefit need not inure to the
taxpaying public in order to characterize the distribution as for a
corporate purpose.
These authorities alone would tempt one to conclude that an ex-
penditure of tax funds as rebates to property owners who agree to
improve their property in accord with an urban renewal plan would
assuredly be in the interest of a legitimate corporate objective. How-
ever, a number of decisions, which seem to require that all disburse-
ments, to be for a corporate purpose, must be in payment of a legally
enforceable debt of the municipality, casts doubt upon this proposition.
A municipal corporation cannot use tax monies to pay a gratuity to
a private individual or private corporation. To do so would clearly not
be for a corporate purpose. Yet, is it equally true that only that distri-
bution of tax funds is for a corporate purpose which is in payment of
a corporate debt? Certainly the taxpayers of the city in Board of
Library Directors v. City of Lake Forest42 had no legally enforceable
claim against the revenue of the township; nor had the General Assem-
bly sought to discharge any debt by legislation. Yet, although there
was no debt there, neither was the payment a gift or gratuity.
So too in People v. Bunge Bros. Coal Co.,43 an appropriation and
levy of tax funds for dues to the Illinois Municipal League and the
United States Conference of Mayors was held to be for a corporate
purpose, although, it goes without saying, that there was no enforce-
able debt for which the dues were a payment. It would seem, there-
fore, that the essence of the term "corporate purpose" is that for
every expenditure of tax revenue there must be some perceptible quid
pro quo redounding to the general welfare and prosperity of the pub-
lic within the taxing unit.
On this analysis, the use of tax funds to provide pensions for public
servants retiring in the future would effectuate a legitimate corporate
objective, i.e.,
by encouraging competent and faithful employees to remain in 'the service and
refrain from embarking on other vocations; and, second, by retiring from the
4142 Ill. 8 (1866).
42 17 11. 2d 277, 161 N.E. 2d 272 (1959).
43 392 .153, 64 N.E. 2d 365 (1945).
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public service those who, by devoting their best energies for a long period of
years to the performance of duties in a public office or employment, have for
that reason, or because of advanced age, become incapacitated from performing
the duties as well as they might be performed by others more youthful or in
greater physical or mental vigor.44
But if provision is made for the payment of a pension to employees of
a municipality who are already retired, such a disbursement of tax
funds would not be for a corporate purpose.4 5 The same reasoning
would seem to be applicable to bonuses for servicemen under the
Soldiers' Compensation Act. Yet, that act was upheld in Hagler v.
Small48 despite the close analogy between retired municipal employees
and discharged servicemen. Apparently the fact that the validity of a
state's disposition of tax revenue is determined by the public purpose
motivating it, whereas a municipality must collect taxes for corporate
purposes was the differentiating factor between these decisions, absent,
of course, any extra-legal considerations.
In yet another group of cases, however, the Illinois courts have more
closely distinguished between expenditures which were donations and
those which were in payment of legally enforceable debts. Thus, in
Berman v. Board of Education of City of Chicago,47 the Illinois
Supreme Court enjoined the issuance of bonds, under an act of the
General Assembly, by the Board of Education of Chicago to pay tax
anticipation warrants where the taxes anticipated had not been col-
lected. The main thrust of the opinion was that "tax anticipation war-
rants are not debts and do not represent direct legal obligations of the
municipality issuing them. It follows that an appropriation and levy
for their payment must fail, since not for a corporate purpose. '48 Later
decisions,49 on the issue of tax anticipation warrants, have adopted the
reasoning and conclusion of the Berman opinion.
Notwithstanding, only a modicum of controlling weight should be
accorded these decisions since they stand, in point of time, between a
number of opinions which have affirmatively established that some-
44 Porter v. Loehr, 332 1. 353, 359, 163 N.E. 689, 691 (1928).
45 Porter v. Loehr, 332 M11. 353, 163 N.E. 689 (1928). See also People v. Abbott, 274
IMI. 380, 113 N.E. 696 (1916).
46 307 l. 460, 138 N.E. 849 (1923).
47 360 M1. 535, 196 N.E. 464 (1935).
48 Berman v. Board of Education of City of Chicago, 360 Ill. 535, 542, 196 N.E. 464,467
(1935).
49 Leviton v. Board of Education of City of Chicago, 374 Ill. 594, 30 N.E. 2d 497
(1940); Dimond v. Commissioner of Highways, 366 IIl. 503, 9 N.E. 2d 197 (1937).
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thing less than a legally enforceable debt will suffice to constitute a
corporate purpose, for the payment of which tax funds may be allo-
cated. In addition, the temper of the times in which the Berman case
and its aftermath occurred might explicate, to some extent, those hold-
ings.
In any event, the possibility exists that a tax plan for any particular
urban renewal area may be devised in congruity with both the narrow
line of the Berman case and the more liberal attitude of opinions like
Board of Library Directors v. City of Lake Forest. Thus, the distribu-
tion of the tax funds appropriated to this purpose could be predicated
upon a contractual agreement between the governmental instrumental-
ity directing urban renewal projects and the property owner that in
consideration of the payment of a fixed percentage of the costs of the
contemplated improvements, the property owner agrees to accomplish
the renovations according to the reasoned judgment of a reputable
panel of architectural experts selected by the governmental agency. In
this way, a binding obligation, in the sense of the transfer of a quid pro
quo, would be created, the satisfaction of which would be a corporate
purpose.
However, the dilemma is not yet resolved. A corporate purpose, it
has been seen, must possess some ascertainable nexus with or be ger-
mane to legitimate objectives of the municipality. Yet, a municipality,
as an instrument of delegated powers, can only perform those func-
tions which have been granted to it by the General Assembly or which
are reasonably inferable from them.50 Furthermore, in viewing the
concept of public or corporate purpose, the Illinois Supreme Court has
taken pains to disaffirm any suggestion that the term is a static concept.
On the contrary, it is evolutive, "flexible, and is capable of expansion
to meet conditions of a complex society that were not within the con-
templation of the framers of our constitution." 51
Consequently, the power of a municipality to regulate the use of
streets, to regulate fire hazards and to control local transportation
problems warrants, without an additional express grant from the Gen-
eral Assembly, an appropriation for the consolidation of passenger and
freight terminals. 52 So too the power to eliminate slum areas includes,
50 People v. Rice, 356 111. 373, 190 N.E. 681 (1934).
51 People v. Chicago Railroad Terminal Authority, 14 Ill. 2d 230, 236, 151 N.E. 2d 311,
314 (1958).
52 People v. Fleetwood, 413 Ml. 530, 109 N.E. 2d 741 (1952).
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by necessary implication, the authority to pass an ordinance issuing
slum clearance bonds and to levy taxes to pay for them.3
Is there any doubt, then, that, within the express terms of the
Urban Community Conservation Act,"4 there inheres sufficient legis-
lative warrant for the appropriation of tax revenues to aid landowners
in a land conservation project area in the rehabilitation of their resi-
dences. Even the language of the Urban Community Conservation Act
itself preponderates in favor of this proposition, i.e.,
(c) For the purpose of aiding in the planning, undertaking or carrying out of
a Conservation Plan of Conservation Board hereunder, a municipality may (in
addition to its other powers and upon such terms with or without ... consider-
ation . . . as it may determine) do and perform any or all of the actions or things
which, by the provisions of subsection(a) of this section, a public body is au-
thorized to do or perform, including the furnishing of financial and other assist-
ance.55
In conclusion, one other measure should be succinctly mentioned
and, with equal brevity, discounted as impractical. Our discussion,
thus far, has concerned general taxation, which applies to all property
within a taxing unit. It is also conceivable that a special assessment
could be levied on property throughout any urban renewal area to pay
for rebates to those who agree to improve their property as directed.
To justify such an imposition, such property renovations must have a
more direct benefit upon the property assessed to pay for contributions
to them than in the case of general taxation. In addition, these improve-
ments must fit within the legal meaning of "local improvements." But
aside from the legal issue, special assessments are, of their very nature,
a "one-time" affair, i.e., installation of sewers, roads, etc., but property
rehabilitation is a continuing process, which would require continuing
special assessments. Human nature is not such as to brook such intermi-
nable assessments for, what basically is, the same purpose.
CONCLUSION
Without cavil or compromise, it can be asserted, on the basis of the
preceding analysis, that the land use planning involved in urban re-
newal can be forwarded, in complete consonance with relevant legis-
lative and judicial authorities and constitutional principles in Illinois,
through the expenditure of property tax revenues to stimulate or
53 People v. City of Chicago, 394 Ill. 477, 68 N.E. 2d 761 (1946).
54 ILL. REV. STAT., ch. 67 1/2 S§ 91.8-91.16 (1961).
5 ILL. REv. STAT., ch. 67 1/2, S 91.14a(c) (1959) (Emphasis added).
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revivify the efforts of property owners in the care and management of
their property. The particular blessing of this suggestion, which is sore-
ly lacking in others with the same objective, is that it may prevent the
re-entry of many blight producing factors once an urban renewal
project has been completed. Much of our present thinking in urban
planning still gravitates to short term gains, i.e., a housing project or
renewal of a particular area with a transfer of enthusiasm after the
project's completion to a new locus of trouble. The fallacy in this
thinking rests with the assumption that any urban renewal is ever a
fait accompli. Under the proposed plan, urban renewal is recognized
to be the continuing responsibility of the community, first to cure the
existing incidence of blight and then to insure against the probability
of its return by a mechanism suitable for operation on a long term
basis.
So that there may be no misunderstanding about the nature or
method of this plan, thoroughness dictates that one other challenge to
this proposal be answered and that the means of its implementation be
briefly outlined. A reputable authority' 6 has asserted that a plan of this
nature is discriminatory to those who maintain their property without
the necessity of such artificial encouragement or incentive. This is not
so, because these more responsible property owners will, indirectly,
benefit from this program by increasing the value of their property in
proportion to the effectiveness of the proposal upon the owners of
contiguous property. In addition, where a neighborhood shows more
than incipient signs of decay and blight, the owners who would other-
wise maintain their property are discouraged from doing so by the
seeming over-all futility of their acts. Thus, an incentive program of
this nature will, in the long run, impel some to rehabilitate their
properties who, but for this measure, would not do so and will, as a
corollary, give greater impetus and determination to the efforts of
those who are not in such dire need of the dollar support this plan
entails.
And finally, to insure the smooth and consistent operation of this
plan, one must be mindful of the following points. The budget and
appropriation ordinance should include an item, in sufficient detail to
apprise the taxpayers of its exact nature and purpose, for monies to
be disbursed to the urban renewal agency for eventual refunding to
56 Slayton, STATE AND LOCAL INCENTIVES AND TECHNIQUES FOR URBAN RENEWAL, 25
LAW & CONTEMP. PROn. 793, 799, 801 (1960).
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landowners on the following terms, at the least. Landowners may
receive a rebate in varying amounts up to a fixed maximum percentage
of the anticipated cost of the improvements. Rebate amounts should
be determined by the cost of improvements rather than the amount of
property taxes paid in order to obviate the charge that this system is
merely an evasion of the constitutionally impermissible tax abatement
method of controlling land use. In return for the payment, the land-
owner should be required to agree to submit both costs and plans for
approval to the urban renewal agency. In addition, it may be desirable
to introduce into this agreement between property owner and agency
as many covenants running with the land which the practicalities of
the situation may permit. In sum, the manifest intent should be to
distribute funds in consideration of the landowners' surrender of cer-
tain rights to control the character of the improvement to his property.
